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Abstract
Intolerance of uncertainty (IU) is proposed to be a transdiagnostic causal mechanism of psychological diiculties. The 
systematic review sought to evaluate the status of evidence pertaining to IU’s proposed causal inluence upon symptoms of 
psychological conditions. The review collated evidence from studies involving experimental manipulation and assessment 
of temporal precedence to ensure direct assessment of causality. The search strategy and eligibility screening identiied 12 
articles, detailing 15 eligible studies (experimental manipulations: n = 10; temporal precedence studies: n = 5). Available 
evidence comprised symptoms of anxiety- and mood-related conditions, including obsessive–compulsive disorder (OCD). 
The greatest support for IU as a causal mechanism was evident for anxiety-related di culties and, to a lesser extent, negative 
afect; limited support was found for OCD-related diiculties. However, notable inconsistency across study indings for all 
diiculty types precludes absolute conclusions. Implications and recommendations are discussed.
Keywords Intolerance of uncertainty · Transdiagnostic · Psychological mechanism · Anxiety · Depression · Obsessive–
compulsive disorder
Introduction
Uncertainty is a pluralistic state in which there is insuicient 
information to ind resolution. The experience of uncertainty 
can be aversive and threatening. Intolerance of uncertainty 
(IU) refers to di culty enduring the experience of not know-
ing and can give rise to a range of cognitive, emotional, and 
behavioural responses aimed at avoiding and/or resolving the 
aversive experience (Carleton 2016). More than a symptom 
of diiculty, researchers have proposed IU to be a maintain-
ing mechanism and suggested that the range of associated 
responses may illustrate IU’s transdiagnostic relevance to 
understanding and supporting a breadth of psychological 
diiculties (e.g., Carleton 2012, 2016; Einstein 2014).
IU is a hallmark of anxiety conditions, demonstrating 
association with diiculties including generalized anxiety 
(Ladouceur et al. 1999), social anxiety (Boelen and Reijntjes 
2009), panic (Carleton et al. 2014), and obsessive–compul-
sive diiculties (Holaway et al. 2006; Tolin et al. 2003).1 
Meta-analysis has demonstrated strong positive correlation 
between IU and anxiety-related di culties, as well as higher 
IU levels in clinical compared to non-clinical populations 
(Gentes and Ruscio 2011). A recent pathway analysis largely 
demonstrated association between IU and both condition-
speciic vulnerabilities (e.g., generalised anxiety-related 
‘negative metacognitions’) and condition symptoms them-
selves (Shihata et al. 2017). This research also suggests that, 
while trait IU may present as a general vulnerability under-
pinning multiple di culties, consideration of condition-spe-
ciic IU may help clarify the difering trajectories associated 
with this proposed common mechanism. Consistent with 
the notion of divergent trajectories and multiinality (see 
Nolen-Hoeksema and Watkins 2011), uncertainty may pre-
sent as aversive and intolerable for many; however, diferent 
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conigurations of concern, interpretation, and response to 
that experience may be associated with diferent psychologi-
cal diiculties. The manifestation of these diiculties may 
extend beyond anxiety.
Evidence supports the proposition that IU may have rel-
evance to a range of other psychological di culties. There is 
substantial correlational evidence to suggest IU is associated 
with depression (Gentes and Ruscio 2011). Not only have 
IU levels appeared signiicantly higher in clinical samples of 
individuals with depression compared to non-clinical sam-
ples, but the distribution of IU levels also appears compara-
ble across depression and anxiety-related conditions, with 
the possible exception of ‘panic disorder’ (Carleton et al. 
2012). This evidence is consistent with meta-analytic sup-
port suggesting that IU may contribute substantially to the 
core latent process of cognitive vulnerability underpinning 
diiculties across emotional diiculties (Hong and Cheung 
2015).
Outside of anxiety and depression, meta-analysis has also 
demonstrated elevated levels of IU in individuals with eating 
disorders compared to controls; leading the authors to pro-
pose IU as a potential therapeutic target (Brown et al. 2017). 
Additionally, although less established, IU may also have 
relevance to psychosis. In a sample of 27 individual expe-
riencing psychosis, White and Gumley (2010) found posi-
tive correlations between IU and a range of distress-related 
beliefs and responses, such as avoidance, hyper-arousal, and 
perceived loss of control. Furthermore, worry (a key experi-
ence in anxiety diiculties) is proposed to be a core com-
ponent process contributing to diiculties associated with 
psychosis (Freeman and Garety 2014), which supports the 
theoretical basis for considering a potential link between IU 
and psychosis. In summary, the available evidence supports 
the proposition that IU may be an underlying transdiagnostic 
mechanism and vulnerability associated with the presence 
of a range of psychological diiculties.
Transdiagnostic, mechanism-based conceptions of psy-
chological di culties are arguably of increasing importance, 
as both clinical (Awenat et al. 2013) and research commu-
nities (Cuthbert and Insel 2013) call for more explanatory 
alternatives to the hegemonic diagnostic model. The validity 
and utility of the traditional diagnostic model has increas-
ingly come under question. High levels of comorbidity 
between conditions challenge the supposed discreteness of 
psychiatric diagnoses, as well as alluding to potential com-
mon underpinning mechanisms (Krueger and Eaton 2015). 
Developing our understanding of transdiagnostic mecha-
nisms may facilitate the development of more efective, 
eicient, and unifying interventions and support. However, 
causal, rather than purely associative, relationships between 
proposed mechanisms such as IU and condition symptoms 
require substantiation to warrant intervention development 
and delivery.
Hierarchical consideration of evidence is necessary to 
establish whether IU exhibits a causal inluence upon con-
dition symptoms. Correlational evidence provides a sensi-
ble association-based foundation for supporting a relation 
between IU and multiple psychological diiculties. Cor-
relational data, however, provide insuicient evidence to 
conclude a causal relation. Kazdin (2007) highlights the 
importance of additional forms and targets of assessment, 
such as: (1) experimental manipulation to demonstrate 
that change in a mechanism causes change in a symptom, 
and (2) demonstration of temporal precedence, such that 
mechanism change precedes symptom change.
Existing systematic review provides evidence of cor-
relational associations between IU and multiple psycho-
logical diiculties (Gentes and Ruscio 2011). However, 
uncertainties remain; extension beyond correlation to 
direct assessment of causality through experimental and 
longitudinal designs remains essential to fully under-
standing IU’s contribution to psychological diiculties 
and informing appropriate intervention (see Shihata et al. 
2016 for review). Individual studies employing experimen-
tal manipulation and assessment of temporal precedence 
exist. For example, Mosca et  al. (2016) conducted an 
experimental manipulation based on Grenier and Ladou-
ceur (2004), involving participants progressively consider-
ing potential outcomes of a possible negative future life 
event followed by reading statements designed to induce 
high or low IU. Mosca et al. (2016) reported signiicantly 
higher levels of worry (after controlling for baseline worry 
levels) in the high IU manipulation condition, compared 
to the low IU and control conditions. However, the study 
authors only demonstrated this signiicant diference in the 
second of two similar manipulation studies reported within 
the same article. This discrepancy may be attributable to 
a larger sample size and slight methodological diferences 
in the manipulation task in the second study, compared to 
the irst; however, similar discrepancy has also been found 
between studies by independent research teams employ-
ing equivalent manipulation procedures (Faleer et  al. 
2017—study 1; Rosen and Knäuper 2009). The observed 
discrepancies highlight a need for aggregation of experi-
mental evidence exploring the potential causal inluence 
of IU upon psychological diiculties. This aggregation 
is currently absent. Similarly, while some have reported 
that change in IU occurs prior to symptom change (e.g., 
Bomyea et al. 2015), others have reported less deinitive 
evidence (e.g., Goldman et al. 2007). Consequently, while 
individual studies involving experimental manipulation of 
IU and assessment of temporal precedence exist, the dis-
crepancies outlined highlight the need for a comprehensive 
synthesis and review of this evidence.
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Review Objectives
The primary review objective was to provide systematic 
summary and interrogation of the current status of evi-
dence regarding IU as a causal transdiagnostic mechanism 
of psychological diiculty. The review aimed to build upon 
existing correlational evidence (Gentes and Ruscio 2011) 
by evaluating the extant body of research directly assessing 
causality through data pertaining to experimental manipu-
lation and longitudinal assessment of temporal precedence. 
As human experience and diiculty may be considered as 
dimensional (ranging from the general population to clinical 
populations), rather than a dichotomous separation (Widi-
ger and Samuel 2005), the review was not limited to clini-
cal samples and data pertaining to individual symptoms of 
psychological conditions in any sample were considered 
relevant.
Method
Search
The systematic review of the literature employed a Boolean 
search strategy comprising the core search components of 
‘intolerance of uncertainty’ and ‘psychological condition’—
see Supplementary Material. An extensive range of relevant 
synonyms comprised each core component and ‘psychologi-
cal conditions’ were based on the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders, 5th edition (DSM-5; Ameri-
can Psychiatric Association 2013). The review adhered to 
PRISMA guidance for systematic reviews (Liberati et al. 
2009); however, a review protocol was not registered.
Study Selection
Eligibility screening of articles involved three stages: (1) 
review of titles and abstracts to ascertain initial relevance, 
(2) review of potentially relevant articles in full, and (3) sys-
tematic extraction of data from the relevant qualifying arti-
cles. In addition, prior to inal extraction, the reference lists 
of studies identiied for inal inclusion were also screened for 
additional articles. The review author completed all stages 
of screening. A second reviewer performed a blind screen-
ing of a random subset (n = 25) of articles identiied at stage 
two—randomisation was achieved using Microsoft Excel’s 
random number generator. Reviewers demonstrated 84% 
agreement. The reviewers resolved disagreement through 
discussion without the need for arbitration. Without excep-
tion, discussion led to resolution of disagreement in support 
of the primary reviewer’s appraisal.
Information Sources
The search was conducted in February 2018 through the 
following electronic databases: Academic Search Complete, 
CINAHL Plus, Medline, PsycARTICLES, PsycINFO, and 
Web of Science. The search did not employ date restric-
tions. Where possible ‘human’ sample was included as an 
additional search limiter.
Eligibility Criteria
Studies Types
Studies eligible for inclusion involved either experimental 
manipulation or longitudinal assessment of IU (i.e., temporal 
precedence studies).
Experimental Manipulation Studies The review objective 
was to determine the inluence of IU, rather than evaluate a 
speciic manipulation technique. Consequently, any success-
ful IU manipulation was eligible for inclusion, irrespective 
of manipulation technique employed. Successful manipula-
tions constituted those demonstrating statistically signiicant 
within-group change in IU pre-to-post manipulation and/or 
statistically signiicant diference in IU between experimen-
tal groups, post-manipulation. The review excluded unsuc-
cessful manipulations as they could not inform evaluation 
of the subsequent impact of IU change upon symptoms of 
psychological diiculty.
Studies involving therapeutic interventions were eligible 
as manipulation evidence, only if the intervention consisted 
of one intervention component solely targeting IU as the 
mechanism of change. Intervention studies involving mul-
tiple treatment components and multiple potential process 
variables could not guarantee the speciic agent of change 
and therefore did not qualify as manipulation evidence.
Temporal Precedence Studies Longitudinal studies were 
eligible for inclusion if they included assessment of tem-
poral precedence of change in IU in relation to change in 
symptom level (i.e., involving time-lag analysis). Stud-
ies involving assessment of temporal precedence required 
a minimum of three assessment points to ensure that the 
reported evidence extended beyond concurrent change 
between IU and symptom level; studies involving experi-
mental manipulation did not need to meet this requirement 
due to the direct manipulation of IU.
Studies involving therapeutic interventions were eligible 
as temporal precedence evidence providing they met the 
criteria outlined above. As temporal precedence evidence 
pertains to sequence of change and not IU manipulation, 
the review did not impose an eligibility criterion in terms of 
intervention content and therapeutic focus.
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Participants
The review did not apply eligibility restrictions based 
on participant characteristics (e.g., age, sex, clinical 
diagnosis).
Outcomes and Measures
Eligible studies included assessment of both IU and at least 
one symptom associated with a psychological condition. 
The process variable of interest was IU. Primary outcome 
variables were any symptom (or symptom cluster) relating 
to a recognised psychological condition based on the DSM 
taxonomy. The review did not include eligibility restrictions 
based on speciic measures (e.g., particular questionnaires); 
behavioural, interview, and self-report measurements were 
all eligible. For all included variables, both validated and 
unvalidated assessment methods were permitted within the 
review.
Additional Exclusion Criteria
Studies were ineligible for inclusion if the report involved:
(a) Cross-sectional non-experimental data only;
(b) Single-case designs;
(c) Retrospectively recalled data only;
(d) Sample size < 12. Criterion based on power analysis 
assessment of the minimum number of participants 
required to power the most basic relevant analysis (i.e., 
a paired samples t test) to detect a large efect;
(e) Manipulation studies in which:
 i. The manipulation (or intervention qualifying as 
manipulation) was unsuccessful in changing IU;
 ii. The intervention did not solely target IU
(f) Longitudinal studies (including interventions) that 
included fewer than three relevant assessment points
(g) Studies not appearing in a peer-reviewed journal or 
were poster abstracts;
(h) Studies not reported in English.
Data Collection Process
Data were systematic extracted using a standardised form 
created for the purposes of the present review. In the event of 
ambiguity in study report and/or absence of necessary data 
for efect size calculations, the review author consulted with 
study authors and/or supplementary datasets where possible.
Data Items
Extracted data pertained to sample information, study 
design, assessment measures, analytic methods, and out-
comes. Data extracted were from variables relevant to the 
review focus only (i.e., IU and symptoms of psychological 
diiculty). Similarly, extracted outcomes were from analy-
ses relevant to the review focus of assessing the impact of 
IU manipulation and/or temporal precedence only. Media-
tion analyses were extracted providing they were not based 
on purely cross-sectional data and their focus was relevant: 
i.e., analysis assessed IU mediation between manipulation 
group and symptoms in experimental manipulation studies; 
or time-lagged IU mediation between time and symptoms in 
temporal precedence studies. Extracted data also included 
those required to calculate efect sizes for magnitude of IU 
observed within each study.
Summary Measures
The review aimed to provide narrative synthesis rather than 
calculate study outcome efect sizes or efect size aggregates. 
These statistics were not anticipated to be reliably calculable 
given the necessary range of evidence permitted within the 
review to enable evaluation of the potential transdiagnostic 
breadth of IU’s inluence. However, to facilitate interpreta-
tion of results, the review did aim to provide evidence of 
the magnitude of IU level observed within individual stud-
ies. Review Manager (RevMan 2014, version 5.3) was used 
to calculate efect sizes (Hedges’ adjusted g), 95% coni-
dence intervals, and produce forest plots. The included efect 
sizes comprised standardised diference in mean IU level 
between-groups (e.g., high vs. low IU) for the manipulation 
studies; and standardised within-group change in mean IU 
level (irst to last assessment point) for the temporal prec-
edence studies. This approach provided a pragmatic way to 
assess magnitude of IU consistently across studies based 
on typically available data; however, limitations remain. 
Between-group diference is not a measure of change, and 
reducing within-group change to two time-points does not 
necessarily capture the largest change in IU across the meas-
ured timeframe. Hence, the included statistics provide a ten-
tative indication of the magnitude of IU diference or change 
within individual studies to support the narrative synthesis.
Risk of Bias: Quality Assessment
Study quality was assessed with reference to the Cochrane 
risk of bias tool (see Higgins and Green 2011). A narrative, 
rather than numerical, assessment of quality was preferred 
as it provided greater transparency of assessment.
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Results
Study Selection
The initial database search identiied 2694 articles. Follow-
ing removal of duplicates and review of titles and abstracts, 
the search identiied 212 articles for full screening. Eligibil-
ity criteria were met by 11 articles. Common reasons for 
exclusion were that studies reported cross-sectional data 
without IU manipulation or lacked assessment of temporal 
precedence. A search of the reference lists of the 11 identi-
ied articles revealed one additional article for inclusion. At 
completion, the outlined screening procedure identiied 12 
articles (presenting 15 eligible studies) fulilling the speci-
ied criteria for inclusion in the inal review—see Fig. 1.
Study Characteristics
Study characteristics are summarised in Table 1. The stud-
ies were conducted in a variety of countries, with the USA 
being the most frequent location (n = 6). In all cases, studies 
reported adult samples. Samples comprised more females 
than males in all but two studies (Su et al. 2016; Wilhelm 
et al. 2015). Where articles reported ethnicity data, white/
Caucasian was the most frequently endorsed category. All 
articles presented data from distinct cohorts. Two articles 
Fig. 1  Flow diagram of study 
eligibility screening and selec-
tion Arcles idenﬁed through 
database search (n = 2694)
Arcle tles and abstracts 
screened (n = 1382)
Duplicates removed            
(n = 1312)
Full arcles assessed for 
eligibility (n = 212)
Arcles excluded              
(n = 1170)
Final arcles included in 
review (n = 12)
Arcles excluded (n = 201)
Reasons (one or more of the following):
Experimental and survey studies
i) Cross-seconal data with no manipulaon 
ii) No measurement IU and/or symptom
iii) Successful IU manipulaon not demonstrated
Intervenon and prospecve studies
i) No measurement of IU 
ii) Intervenon ineligible as manipulaon evidence
iii) Temporal precedence not assessed
General
i) No data 
ii) Poster abstract 
iii) Not English language 
iv) Sample size < 12
Addional arcles from 
eligible arcle reference lists 
(n = 1)
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Table 1  Included studies and sample characteristics
Article, year, and location Sample type Relevant psychological dif-
iculties (*diagnosed)
Sample size
(n by group)
Mean age in years (SD) %  Femalea Ethnicity (n)
Bomyea et al. (2015)
USA
Clinical Generalised anxiety dis-
order*
28 34.4 (10.8) 71.4 White (22), Asian (3), His-
panic (1), Native American 
(1), Other or mixed race 
(1)
Britton and Davey (2014)
UK
General population Anxiety-, obsessive–com-
pulsive-, and mood-
related
61b
(High IU n = 30; low IU 
n = 31)
20.26 (2.82) 73.8 Not reported
Deschenes et al. (2010)
Canada
General population Anxiety- and mood-related 75c
(High IU/negative beliefs 
about uncertainty n = 38; 
low IU/positive beliefs 
about uncertainty n = 37)
28.69 (12.32) 66.7 Caucasian (53), African-
American or Caribbean 
(7), Asian (7), Hispanic 
(1), Aboriginal (1), Multi-
racial (4), Other ethnic 
origins (2)
Faleer et al. (2017)
USA
General population Obsessive–compulsive-, 
anxiety-, and mood-
related
 Study 1 60
(High IU n = 30; low IU 
n = 30)
20.4 (3.4) 68.4d Caucasian (37), African 
American (14) Asian (4), 
Bi-racial (3), Hispanic (2), 
and Other (1)
 Study 2 83
(High IU n = 37; low IU 
n = 46)
19.7 (3.0) 58 Caucasian (45), African 
American (23), Asian (6), 
Bi-racial (3), Other (5), 
and did not report (1)
Additionally: 12.0% also 
identiied as Hispanic or 
 Latinoe
 Study 3 95
(High IU n = 51; low IU 
n = 44)
19.3 (1.8) 61.1 Caucasian (44)
Black/African American 
(30), Asian American (5), 
Native American (1)
Multi-racial (5), Other (7), 
and did not report (3)
Additionally: 15.8% also 
identiied as Hispanic or 
 Latinoe
Goldman et al. (2007)
Canada
General population Anxiety- and mood-related 30
(Intervention n = 15; con-
trol n = 15)
26.0 (10.2) 66.7
(Same male:female ratio in 
both groups)
European White (16), Asian 
or Asian American (8), 
Middle Eastern (3), His-
panic (1), East Indian (1), 
and biracial (1)
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a Percentages not reported to 1 decimal place are as reported in the original article
b Participants in experiment three involving IU manipulation only
c 75 participants for preliminary Visual Analogue Scale assessment of anxiety and mood; 74 participants included in primary dependent variable analyses (interpretation bias and catastrophising 
scores); one participant’s data removed from ‘negative beliefs manipulation group’ during manipulation check
d One participant did not report their sex
e Email correspondence with the article author conirmed that igures pertaining to the ethnicity response category ‘Hispanic’ were not mutually exclusive from other self-reported ethnicity cat-
egories; therefore these igures are additional information and should not be included in the total response percentages
f Generalised anxiety disorder was the condition of interest in article; however, assessment of anxiety was not speciic to this diagnosis
g 40 included in inal analyses as three participants removed as univariate outliers
h 167 included in inal analyses as two participants removed as univariate outliers
i 12 participants dropped out across study; however, all data prior to drop out included in analyses
Table 1  (continued)
Article, year, and location Sample type Relevant psychological dif-
iculties (*diagnosed)
Sample size
(n by group)
Mean age in years (SD) %  Femalea Ethnicity (n)
Hedman et al. (2013)
Sweden
Clinical Severe health anxiety/
hypochrondriasis*
81
(Intervention n = 40; con-
trol n = 41)
Intervention: 39.3 (9.8)
Control: 38.8 (9.5)
74.1
(Intervention: 70.0; con-
trol: 78.1)
Not reported
Ladouceur et al. (2000)
Canada
General population Anxiety-relatedf 42
(High IU n = 21; low IU 
n = 21)
Females: 23.8 (7.07)
Males: 21.7 (1.92)
71.4 Not reported
Meeten et al. (2012)
UK
General population Anxiety- and mood-related 46
(High IU n = 25; low IU 
n = 21)
26.8 (5.52) 71.7 Not reported
Mosca et al. (2016)
Italy
General population Anxiety- and mood-related
 Study 1 43g
(High IU n = 22; low IU 
n = 21)
Not reported 68 Not reported
 Study 2 169h
(High IU n = 59; low IU 
n = 58; control n = 52)
24.83 (4.74) 82.8 Not reported
Rosen and Knäuper (2009)
Canada
General population Anxiety-related 153
(High IU/high SU n = 30; 
high IU/low SU n = 29; 
low IU/high SU n = 53; 
low IU/low SU n = 41)
Females: 20.80 (2.11)
Males: 23.61 (8.28)
81.7 Not reported
Su et al. (2016)
USA
Clinical Obsessive–compulsive 
disorder*
70i 32.6 (11.0) 49 Non-Hispanic white (66)
Wilhelm et al. (2015)
USA
Clinical Obsessive–compulsive 
disorder*
36 32.7 (10.5) 47.2 Caucasian (34), Asian (1), 
Hispanic (1)
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presented eligible data from multiple studies, contributing 
ive studies between them (Faleer et al. 2017; Mosca et al. 
2016).
The psychological di culties focused on within the stud-
ies were predominantly anxiety- and mood-related. Only 
four studies involved clinical samples; focusing on gener-
alised anxiety disorder (GAD) (Bomyea et al. 2015), hypo-
chondriasis (Hedman et al. 2013), and obsessive–compulsive 
disorder (OCD) (Su et al. 2016; Wilhelm et al. 2015). All 
other studies involved non-clinical samples.
Study Designs
Included studies investigated the inluence of IU through 
experimental manipulation or temporal precedence as a 
process variable of a therapeutic intervention. Experimen-
tal manipulations accounted for ten of the included stud-
ies (Britton and Davey 2014—study 3 included in review 
only; Deschenes et al. 2010; Faleer et al. 2017—studies 
1–3; Ladouceur et al. 2000; Meeten et al. 2012; Mosca et al. 
2016—studies 1 & 2; Rosen and Knäuper 2009). Interven-
tion studies involving assessment of temporal precedence 
of IU change in relation to symptom change featured in ive 
articles (Bomyea et al. 2015; Goldman et al. 2007; Hedman 
et al. 2013, Su et al. 2016; Wilhelm et al. 2015).
Manipulations All experimental studies manipulated partic-
ipants into either high or low IU groups for comparison. Only 
one experimental study involved a non-manipulated control 
comparison (Mosca et al. 2016—study 2). Deschenes et al. 
(2010) manipulated participant beliefs about uncertainty 
to be either negative or positive. The authors characterised 
IU as negative beliefs about uncertainty and demonstrated 
signiicantly diferent levels of IU between groups. Conse-
quently, the review presents the results from this study as 
comparable to the other high/low IU manipulations.
Manipulation procedures varied across studies. Two stud-
ies utilised identical manipulation procedures (Faleer et al. 
2017; Rosen and Knäuper 2009). The linguistic manipu-
lation employed (based on Salancik and Conway 1975) 
involved altering the wording of IU questionnaire response 
options to increase or decrease the likelihood of state-
ment endorsement, followed by rigged standardised feed-
back about the participant’s ability to tolerate uncertainty, 
dependent on manipulation group. A discrepancy between 
these two studies, however, was that Rosen and Knäuper 
(2009) also employed a manipulation of ‘situational uncer-
tainty’ through information provision that either did, or did 
not, encourage ambiguity as to the likelihood of participants 
having a ictitious health condition. The study considered 
both main efects and the interaction between these two 
manipulations.
The two studies presented in Mosca et  al. (2016) 
employed near identical IU manipulations involving a Ver-
tical Arrow Technique (VAT). This manipulation replicated 
Grenier and Ladouceur (2004) with the modiication of 
focusing on a personal negative, rather than neutral, possi-
ble future life event. During the VAT procedure, participants 
reported potential sequential consequences stemming from 
an initial possible negative life event. The procedure was 
similar to that of the Catastrophising Interview (see “Assess-
ment Methods and Outcomes” below), but was self-admin-
istered. High and low IU manipulation was initiated through 
participants subsequently reading statements relating to an 
inability or ability to tolerate uncertainty, respectively. The 
manipulation procedure was slightly adapted between study 
one and two, largely in terms of: (1) an increase in delay 
between VAT and statements (this interval was included as 
a covariate in subsequent analysis), (2) refreshing memory 
of VAT, and (3) ceasing to direct participants to read the 
manipulation statements aloud.
The preferred method of manipulation in two studies was 
through a vignette, which described a protagonist experienc-
ing either high or low IU. Follow-up instructions difered 
between these studies, such that participants either provided 
advice for the vignette protagonist (Britton and Davey 2014) 
or considered a personalised uncertain situation from the 
protagonist’s perspective (Meeten et al. 2012).
The remaining two studies reported relatively standalone 
manipulation techniques. Deschenes et al.’s (2010) manipu-
lation involved a Powerpoint presentation on the impact of 
uncertainty on problem solving, emphasising the impact 
as negative or positive dependent on manipulation group. 
Ladouceur et al. (2000) employed a rigged-outcome gam-
bling task, emphasising or minimising the likelihood of 
negative outcome and consequence dependent on manipu-
lation group.
All manipulation studies included a manipulation check. 
Post-manipulation high/low IU group diferences provided 
evidence of successful manipulation in ive studies (Brit-
ton and Davey 2014; Deschenes et al. 2010; Faleer et al. 
2017—study 1; Ladouceur et al. 2000; Meeten et al. 2012). 
A further ive studies reported post-manipulation group dif-
ferences after controlling for pre-manipulation IU scores 
(Faleer et al. 2017—studies 2 & 3; Mosca et al. 2016—stud-
ies 1 & 2; Rosen and Knäuper 2009). Additionally, Mosca 
and colleagues introduced a control group in study two and 
reported that the group diferences were evident in all group 
comparisons, with the exception of low IU compared to 
control group. Finally, three studies assessed within-group 
increase and decrease in high and low IU groups, respec-
tively (Faleer et al. 2017—studies 2 & 3; Rosen and Knäuper 
2009). Each of these studies demonstrated evidence of sig-
niicant IU change pre-to-post manipulation in the intended 
direction, with the exception of Faleer et al. (2017—study 
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3) who found signiicant change in the low IU group only. 
The study authors concluded that manipulation was only 
partially successful.
Interventions. The review did not identify any interven-
tion studies with suicient speciicity in terms of therapeutic 
focus and agent of change to meet eligible criteria for inclu-
sion as manipulation evidence.
Temporal Precedence Evidence pertaining to temporal 
precedence included studies incorporating assessment of 
time-lagged mediation or prediction models. In this review, 
this type of evidence came exclusively from intervention 
studies; no non-intervention prospective studies were iden-
tiied.
Of the studies evaluating temporal precedence, two stud-
ies conducted eligible mediation analyses investigating 
time-lagged IU level as a mediator of symptom level across 
time (Bomyea et al. 2015, Su et al. 2016). Whilst Hedman 
et al. (2013) included both traditional mediation analysis and 
time-lag analysis of mediator on symptoms, only the latter 
was eligible for inclusion in this review. The remaining two 
studies did not conduct a full traditional mediation analysis, 
but did assess time-lagged IU level (Goldman et al. 2007) or 
time-lagged change in IU (Wilhelm et al. 2015) as a predic-
tor of subsequent symptom level.
There were additional variations in analytic approach 
between studies. IU at the same time point as the symptom 
outcome was additionally controlled for in one study (Gold-
man et al. 2007); and two studies controlled for symptom 
level at the previous time point (Hedman et al. 2013, Su et al. 
2016). Su et al. (2016) also included depression within their 
mediation analysis as a non-speciic mediator. The remain-
ing two studies included no additional covariates (Bomyea 
et al. 2015; Wilhelm et al. 2015).
Interventions. Cognitive and behavioural models of 
psychological diiculties typically informed the included 
interventions. Consequently, interventions aimed to target 
and test the accuracy of di cult cognitions and/or increased 
contact with diicult experiences through exposure, but not 
always in combination.
Interventions included cognitive behavioural therapy 
(CBT) delivered as an internet-based intervention (Hedman 
et al. 2013) and as a computer-assisted face-to-face interven-
tion (Bomyea et al. 2015). Hedman et al. (2013) reported 
a 12-week intervention based on the cognitive behavioural 
model, with the primary focus being exposure and response 
prevention (EX/RP). The intervention also included mind-
fulness training as a form of exposure work. Bomyea et al. 
(2015) reported focus on exposure as well as cognitive 
restructuring in their ten-session intervention. Both inter-
ventions utilised modular treatment formats and incorpo-
rated elements such as psychoeducation and relapse preven-
tion. Neither intervention included a treatment component 
speciically targeting IU, but both considered IU a potential 
intervention process variable based on cognitive behavioural 
theory.
Wilhelm et al. (2015) reported a 22-session cognitive 
therapy intervention primarily focusing on cognitive change. 
The behavioural components included in the intervention 
were in the form of behavioural experiments designed to test 
cognitions, rather than progressive exposure work.
The remaining two studies employed solely exposure-
based interventions in the form of EX/RP (Su et al. 2016) 
and written exposure (Goldman et al. 2007). The EX/RP 
intervention was therapist delivered and consisted of 17 
twice-weekly sessions in the acute treatment phase—during 
the subsequent maintenance phase additional full sessions 
were also available as required to meet a standardised symp-
tom threshold, before transitioning to half-length sessions. 
The written exposure intervention consisted of ive sessions 
in which participants described the same ‘worst fear com-
ing true’ and were encouraged to include increasing depth 
of description across sessions. The control condition in this 
study followed the same instructions for an unemotional 
possible future event. Of the ive studies, only two included 
control conditions for comparison (Goldman et al. 2007; 
Hedman et al. 2013); however, the latter study appeared to 
collapse treatment and control conditions for the temporal 
precedence analysis included in this review.
Assessment Methods and Outcomes
Intolerance of  Uncertainty: Mechanism Measures Assess-
ment of intolerance of uncertainty was, near exclusively, 
through self-report. The most frequently employed measure 
was the Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (IUS; Freeston 
et  al. 1994), also utilised in short-form (IUS-12; Carleton 
et al. 2007). The full unmodiied 27-item IUS was employed 
in one study (Goldman et al. 2007); and combined with the 
‘Predictability of Future Contexts’ subscale of the Need for 
Closure Scale (Webster and Kruglanski 1994) in a further 
two studies (Faleer et al. 2017—study 1; Rosen and Knäu-
per 2009). The latter two studies modiied questionnaire 
response options as part of the manipulation task. The short-
form IUS-12 was utilised across one intervention study 
(Bomyea et al. 2015) and was included in three experimen-
tal studies for baseline assessment only (Meeten et al. 2012; 
Mosca et al. 2016—studies 1 & 2). As their primary IU out-
come measures, Meeten and colleagues employed a Visual 
Analogue Scale (VAS), whereas Mosca and colleagues 
employed the IU subscale of the Worry and Intolerance of 
Uncertainty Questionnaire (Grenier and Ladouceur 2004). 
A further three studies utilised ive to six IUS items, with 
(Ladouceur et al. 2000) or without (Britton and Davey 2014; 
Deschenes et  al. 2010) minor adaptation of item phrasing 
to increase their relevance to the manipulation task. Addi-
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tionally, Deschenes et al. (2010) embedded the IUS items 
within a personality measure to reduce demand characteris-
tics. Furthermore, this study included the only behavioural 
assessment of IU using the Probabilistic Inference Task 
(Garety et al. 1991; Ladouceur et al. 1997), accompanied by 
a VAS assessment of participant certainty of the accuracy 
of their task response. However, these assessment methods 
failed to demonstrate signiicant diference between manip-
ulation groups, whereas the IUS scores did.
Of the studies involving clinical samples, two studies 
(Su et al. 2016; Wilhelm et al. 2015) employed the Per-
fectionism/IU subscale of the Obsessive Beliefs Question-
naire (Obsessive–Compulsive Cognitions Working Group; 
OCCWG 2005). Consequently, this variable was not solely a 
measure of IU. Faleer et al. (2017—study 2) utilised the IU 
subscale from the original 87-item version of same measure 
(OCCWG 2001, 2003). Within the same paper, the research 
team also utilised the Intolerance of Uncertainty Index—
Part A (Gosselin et al. 2008) as a baseline assessment of 
IU (study 1) and as an assessment of IU change pre/post 
manipulation (study 3).
Finally, Hedman et al. (2013) utilised the ‘Psychologi-
cal Reactions to Bodily Sensations’ subscale of the short 
version of the Health Anxiety Inventory (Salkovskis et al. 
2002). The authors acknowledged that this measure was not 
an established assessment of IU and urged caution in inter-
preting results.
Symptoms of  Psychological Di culties: Outcome Meas-
ures Included studies predominantly explored anxiety- and 
mood-related diiculties as outcome variables. Assessment 
of obsessive–compulsive related diiculties also featured, 
but to a lesser extent.
Anxiety. Assessment of anxiety-related difficulties 
(excluding OCD-speciic symptoms) featured in 11 stud-
ies. Assessed diiculties included symptoms of general and 
condition-speciic worry (e.g., health anxiety; GAD somatic 
symptoms), catastrophising, and interpretation bias.
In terms of non-condition speciic worry, the most com-
monly employed standardised measure was the Penn State 
Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer et al. 1990), which 
was employed in three studies in either original (Rosen 
and Knäuper 2009), weekly assessment (Goldman et al. 
2007), or abbreviated form (Bomyea et al. 2015). Addi-
tionally, one study included baseline PSWQ assessment 
as a covariate, rather than outcome measure (Faleer et al. 
2017—study 1), and one study employed three PSWQ 
items that had been adapted to reference the manipulation 
task (Ladouceur et al. 2000). Other validated question-
naires assessing anxiety and/or worry included: Worry and 
Intolerance of Uncertainty Questionnaire: Worry subscale 
(Grenier and Ladouceur 2004) in two studies (Mosca et al. 
2016—study 1 & 2), and State-Trait Anxiety Scale (STAI; 
Spielberger 1983) in one study (Rosen and Knäuper 2009). 
Additionally, anxiety was included as a VAS item within 
four studies (Britton and Davey 2014; Deschenes et al. 
2010; Meeten et al. 2012; Mosca et al. 2016—study 2).
Condition-speciic worry was assessed for GAD (Gold-
man et al. 2007) and health anxiety (Hedman et al. 2013) 
using the Worry and Anxiety Questionnaire (Dugas et al. 
2001) and Health Anxiety Inventory—short version 
(SHAI; Salkovskis et al. 2002), respectively. In the lat-
ter study, the outcome variable was a composite of SHAI 
‘Disease Conviction’ and ‘Fear and Worry about Ill-
ness’ subscales. Additionally, Rosen and Knäuper (2009) 
included a single item likert-scale assessment of worry 
due to uncertainty relating to the ictitious health condition 
involved in the manipulation task.
Three studies employed the researcher-delivered Cata-
strophising Interview (Deschenes et al. 2010; Faleer et al. 
2017—study 1; Meeten et  al. 2012). The Catastrophis-
ing Interview (Davey 2006; Vasey and Borkovec 1992) 
employed a VAT to facilitate participant consideration of 
a personal fear and sequence of potential subsequent con-
sequences. Repetition of the process of consequence gen-
eration continued until no further consequences were forth-
coming. The number of times the process was repeated to 
achieve this end was referred to as the number of catastro-
phising steps. The number of steps was the primary outcome 
for this assessment measure in Faleer et al. (2017—study 1) 
and Meeten et al. (2012); whereas Deschenes et al. (2010) 
also assessed perceived likelihood of consequence occur-
rence through participant self-report and perceived severity 
of the inal step through researcher evaluation.
Finally, Deschenes et al. (2010) assessed anxiety-related 
interpretation bias using the Ambiguous/Unambiguous 
Situations Diary (AUSD; Davey et al. 1992; Koerner and 
Dugas 2008). The researchers modiied the task to include 
ambiguous scenarios only. Participants rated ambiguous sce-
narios in terms of worry induced prior to the resolution of 
the scenario, which was resolved with either positive/neutral 
or negative outcome. Participants then rated both the likeli-
hood of the outcome and its perceived level of positivity or 
negativity.
Mood, Affect, and Depression. Assessment of mood-
related difficulties featured in eight studies (Britton and 
Davey 2014; Deschenes et al. 2010; Faleer et al. 2017—
studies 1 & 2; Goldman et al. 2007; Meeten et al. 2012; 
Mosca et al. 2016—studies 1 & 2). Assessment was via 
VAS, with the exceptions of utilisation of the Centre for 
Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale (Radloff 1977) 
by Goldman et al. (2007); and the Positive and Negative 
Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson et al. 1988) by Faleer 
et al. (2017—study 1 & 2; negative affect measured only) 
and Mosca et al. (2016—study 1). Whilst Su et al. (2016) 
included the Hamilton Depression Scale (Hamilton 1960) 
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and included the depression score as a covariate (rather 
than outcome measure) in the IU relevant analysis.
Obsessions and Compulsions. Assessment of symp-
toms relevant to obsessive–compulsive related difficulties 
featured in six studies. Both Su et al. (2016) and Wil-
helm et al. (2015) employed the Yale-Brown Obsessive 
Compulsive Scale (Y-BOCS; Goodman et al. 1989a, b). 
Additionally, Faleer et al. (2017—studies 1–3) assessed 
obsessive–compulsive difficulties using: (1) self-report 
through the Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire: Threat 
Estimation subscale (OCCWG 2001, 2003) and a single 
item assessment of perceived threat of intrusive thoughts 
(Clark et al. 2000); and (2) behavioural assessment of 
checking behaviour—replicating MacDonald and Davey 
(2005), and Rotge et al. (2008). Finally, a single study 
assessed inflated responsibility (Britton and Davey 2014) 
via four items from the Responsibility Attitude Scale 
(RAS; Salkovskis et al. 2000). In support of this assess-
ment, the authors reported significant positive correlation 
between the reduced item set and the full RAS. Inflated 
responsibility may be considered a symptom that is argu-
ably relevant to GAD and depression, as well as OCD (see 
Britton and Davey 2014).
Risk of Bias Within Studies: Quality Assessment
Selection Bias
All but two studies involving multiple participant groups 
reported randomised group allocation, although fre-
quently studies did not detail the randomisation proce-
dure. The two exceptions either failed to state randomisa-
tion (Faleer et al. 2017—study 3) or employed alternating 
allocation (Mosca et al. 2016—study 1), respectively. 
The majority of multiple group studies reported statisti-
cally comparing groups on some baseline metrics (except 
Hedman et al. 2013; Ladouceur et al. 2000). Of these 
studies, six found evidence of baseline differences in IU 
between groups (Faleer et al. 2017—studies 1–3; Gold-
man et al. 2007; Meeten et al. 2012; Rosen and Knäuper 
2009). Rosen and Knäuper (2009) and Faleer et al. (2017) 
consequently included the identified baseline variables as 
covariates in their primary analyses. No studies reported 
baseline between-group differences on primary outcome 
measures, with the exception of higher positive affect in 
the high compared to low IU group in Mosca et al. (2016). 
Additionally, although not the primary outcome variable, 
Faleer et al. (2017—study 1) included baseline PSWQ 
assessed worry as a covariate in subsequent analyses after 
identifying baseline group differences on this measure.
Performance and Detection Bias
In terms of participant blinding, six studies explicitly reported 
concealing the study purpose from participants (Britton and 
Davey 2014; Deschenes et al. 2010; Ladouceur et al. 2000; 
Meeten et al. 2012; Mosca et al. 2016—studies 1 & 2). In addi-
tion, one study reported blinding the researcher to participant 
group (Deschenes et al. 2010) and three studies reported inde-
pendent or blinded assessors (Deschenes et al. 2010; Hedman 
et al. 2013, Su et al. 2016). However, this information was only 
determined for Hedman et al. (2013) after consulting a sister 
publication detailing the main indings of the full intervention 
trial.
Attrition Bias
There was no report of participant dropouts or exclusions in six 
studies (Bomyea et al. 2015; Britton and Davey 2014; Gold-
man et al. 2007; Hedman et al. 2013; Ladouceur et al. 2000; 
Meeten et al. 2012). Of the remaining studies, numbers of 
participants excluded were typically small and conducted for 
methodological reasons, although two intervention studies did 
not report participant reasons for withdrawing (Su et al. 2016; 
Wilhelm et al. 2015). A considerable number of exclusions 
(n = 67) was reported in one study due to criteria needed to 
demonstrate successful manipulation (Rosen and Knäuper 
2009); however, no statistical diference in age or sex between 
included and excluded participants was evident.
Missing data were treated using intention-to-treat 
approaches in two studies (Bomyea et al. 2015; Wilhelm et al. 
2015)—with mean replacement where < 10% of items were 
missing, in the latter study. In addition, Hedman et al. (2013) 
statistically substantiated the randomness of missing data, and 
Su et al. (2016) statistically substantiated no signiicant inlu-
ence of dropouts on outcome.
Reporting Bias
Of the reviewed articles, three were associated with registered 
trials (Bomyea et al. 2015; Hedman et al. 2013, Su et al. 2016). 
However, the reviewed articles were not the primary report 
of those trials. In each case, the registered trial details did not 
include explicit mention of IU, suggesting that IU was not 
the immediate focus of the original research. However, overall 
there was theoretical justiication for focus on IU throughout 
all included studies. Furthermore, both signiicant and non-
signiicant indings were evident, suggesting transparency in 
report.
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Results of Individual Studies
Study Outcomes Within Individual Studies
The summary tables of individual study results provide an 
overview of analyses and outcomes for both experimental 
manipulation (Table 2) and temporal precedence studies 
(Table 3).
The review did not perform a statistical summary of out-
come variables due to the heterogeneity of study outcome 
measures and methods.
Magnitude of IU Within Individual Studies
The magnitude of IU efect size (Hedges’ adjusted g) was 
calculated within each study, except for Wilhelm et  al. 
(2015) where necessary data were not available. The efect 
sizes represent either the diference in IU level between 
manipulation groups for experimental studies (see Fig. 2) 
or change in IU level between irst and last assessment for 
temporal precedence studies (see Fig. 3).
Provision of these efect sizes and conidence intervals 
demonstrates the range and reliability of IU level observed. 
The data are a tentative guide aimed to facilitate interpreta-
tion of the individual study results and comparison across 
studies. These statistics are not an assessment of overall IU 
efect or evaluation of the efectiveness of a speciic meth-
odology (e.g., a particular manipulation technique). In addi-
tion, the review excluded unsuccessful manipulation stud-
ies because they lacked signiicant IU diference/change and 
therefore could not provide assessment of the subsequent 
impact of IU diference/change. Consequently, based on 
the review focus and associated eligibility criteria, tests of 
publication bias and overall efect size robustness were inap-
propriate for these data.
Synthesis of Results
The review studies demonstrated heterogeneity, suggesting 
meta-analyses of study outcomes would be unwise. Conse-
quently, in the interests of transparency and accurate rep-
resentation, the review focused on narrative synthesis. The 
following synthesis stratiies discussion of study results by 
psychological diiculty and evidence type (namely, experi-
mental manipulation and temporal precedence studies, 
respectively).
Anxiety
Experimental Manipulation Studies Investigation of the 
afect of IU manipulation on anxiety-related symptoms 
featured in eight experimental manipulation studies—see 
Table 2. Of the three studies utilising validated multi-item 
measures of anxiety or worry, two demonstrated no signii-
cant diference between manipulations groups, after control-
ling for baseline anxiety/worry (Mosca et al. 2016—study 
1; Rosen and Knäuper 2009). Contrastingly, the remaining 
one study (Mosca et  al. 2016—study 2) reported signii-
cantly higher post-manipulation anxiety levels in the high 
compared to both low IU and control group. Mosca et al. 
(2016) employed the same questionnaire and analytic strat-
egy across both reported studies; consequently, the diferent 
indings may be due to slight modiications in manipulation 
procedures (such as increasing the interval between pre/
post-manipulation and assessment) and/or increased sample 
size in study two.
Several additional studies supported Mosca et al. (2016—
study 2), also demonstrating greater anxiety in the high 
compared to low IU manipulation group post-manipula-
tion. However, it should born in mind that, rather than using 
the full validated measure (or subscale), these studies uti-
lised small, modiied selections of validated measure items 
(Ladouceur et al. 2000) or individual item VAS assessment 
(Britton and Davey 2014; Meeten et al. 2012). These analy-
ses assessed post-manipulation anxiety levels, rather than 
pre-to-post manipulation change. The two analyses assess-
ing change in anxiety between groups, across time, were 
both non-signiicant (Deschenes et al. 2010; Meeten et al. 
2012). Finally, Rosen and Knäuper (2009) assessed worry 
due to uncertainty relating to the ictitious health condition 
involved in the manipulation task, after controlling baseline 
anxiety, IU, and motivation to reduce uncertainty. However, 
the number of (and likely overlap between) covariates, cou-
pled with signiicant IU group diferences only being present 
in interaction with the situation uncertainty manipulation 
(outlined previously), limits the weight that can be placed 
upon this result within the present review.
In addition to anxiety or worry in general, three studies 
assessed the speciic process of catastrophising. Both Faleer 
et al. (2017—study 1) and Meeten et al. (2012) reported a 
signiicantly greater number of average catastrophising steps 
in the high compared to the low IU group, even after con-
trolling for baseline anxiety (as well as participant sex and 
baseline IU in the former study). However, Deschenes et al. 
(2010) reported no signiicant between-group diferences in 
catastrophising steps or the researcher-rated severity of the 
inal step, although the negative beliefs about uncertainty 
group did rate these steps as more likely to occur than the 
positive beliefs group. The difering manipulation methods 
complicate comparison between studies; however, both 
articles reporting signiicant diferences achieved larger IU 
efect sizes between manipulation groups (post-manipula-
tion), compared to Deschenes et al. (2010)—see Fig. 2. Con-
sequently, the strength of manipulation may have had some 
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Table 2  Experimental manipulation studies with outcomes
Article Manipulation details Outcome symptom and 
measure(s)
Analytic approach Outcome  summarya Compared to low  IUb
Anxiety > in high IU NA > in high IU
Britton and Davey (2014)
Study 3 only
Vignette outlining either: 
(a) person encountering 
diiculties due to lack of 
response to uncertainty 
(High IU group); or (b) 
person encountering dif-
iculties due to intolerance 
of uncertainty (Low IU 
group)
For both high/low groups, 
participants required to 
provide advice to the 
person in the vignette
Inlated responsibility
• Responsibility Attitude 
Scale (Salkovskis et al. 
2000)
• 4 Items used only
Anxiety and mood
• Visual Analogue Scale
• 3 Individual items assess-
ing sadness, negativity, 
and anxiety
• Composite score of items 
also calculated
Independent t tests of high/
low IU group diference
Inlated responsibility:
High IU ≃ low IU
Sadness and negativity:
High IU ≃ low IU
Anxiety:
High IU > low IU
Negative mood (composite 
score):
High IU > low IU
✓ ~
Deschenes et al. (2010) Two manipulations groups 
presented lecture on prob-
lem-solving and uncer-
tainty, with uncertainty 
presented as having either: 
(a) a positive impact 
(positive belief about 
uncertainty/low IU group); 
or (b) a negative impact 
(negative beliefs about 
uncertainty/high IU group) 
on problem-solving
Anxiety and mood
• Visual Analogue Scale
• 4 Single items assessing 
anxiety, sadness, fatigue, 
and irritability
Interpretation bias
• Modiied Ambiguous/
Unambiguous Situations 
Diary (Davey et al. 1992; 
Koerner and Dugas 2008)
• Only ambiguous scenarios 
included
Catastrophising/worry
• Catastrophising Interview 
(Vasey and Borkovec 
1992)
2 × 2 ANOVA of group 
high/low IU diferences 
pre-to-post manipulation
ANCOVA of high/low IU 
group diferences in bias 
and catastrophising (covar-
iate: change in irritability)
Irritability:
High IU < low IU pre-to-
post manipulation
Anxiety, sadness, and 
fatigue:
High IU ≃ low IU pre-to-
post manipulation
Interpretation bias:
(a. Worry about ambigu-
ous scenario, b. perceived 
likelihood of pos/neg. 
outcome, and c. perceived 
badness of neg. scenarios)
High IU ≃ low IU
(Perceived positivity of pos-
itive scenario outcomes)
High IU > low IU
Catastrophising:
(Steps and inal step sever-
ity)
High IU ≃ low IU
(Perceived likelihood of 
steps occurring)
High IU < low IU
X X
(Except irritability)
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Table 2  (continued)
Article Manipulation details Outcome symptom and 
measure(s)
Analytic approach Outcome  summarya Compared to low  IUb
Anxiety > in high IU NA > in high IU
Faleer et al. (2017)
 Study 1
Replication of Rosen and 
Knäuper (2009) manipula-
tion
Catastrophising/worry
• Catastrophising Interview 
(Davey 2006)
Afect
• Positive and Negative 
Afect Schedule—negative 
afect only (Watson et al. 
1988)
Perceived threat of intrusive 
thoughts
• Single item; 5-point scale 
(Clark, Purdon, and Byers, 
2000)
ANOVA of high/low IU 
group diferences
ANCOVA also conducted 
(covariates: baseline IU, 
 worryc, and sex)
Catastrophising (number of 
steps):
High IU > low IU
Negative afect:
High IU > low IU
Perceived threat of intrusive 
thoughts:
High IU > low IU
All results held when 
covariates included in 
analyses
✓ ✓
 Study 2 Replication of Rosen and 
Knäuper (2009) manipula-
tion
Afect
• Positive and Negative 
Afect Schedule—negative 
afect only (Watson et al. 
1988)
Checking behaviour
• Checking text for spelling/
grammar errors (MacDon-
ald and Davey, 2005)
ANCOVA of high/low IU 
group diferences (covari-
ate: baseline IU)
Negative afect:
High IU ≃ low IU
Checking behaviour (num-
ber of checks and time 
spent checking):
High IU ≃ low IU
X
(OCD related)
X
 Study 3 Replication of Rosen and 
Knäuper (2009) manipula-
tion
Threat estimation
• Obsessive Beliefs Ques-
tionnaire 87: Threat Esti-
mation subscale (OCCWG 
2001, 2003)
Checking behaviour
• Matching to sample task 
(Rotge et al. 2008)
ANCOVA of high/low IU 
group diferences (covari-
ate: baseline IU)
Threat estimation:
High IU ≃ low IU
Checking behaviour 
(number of checks made, 
time spent checking, and 
accuracy of checking):
High IU ≃ low IU
X
(OCD related)
–
Ladouceur et al. (2000) Roulette gambling task with 
rigged loss outcome
Participants instructed 
that win would result in 
donation to a ictitious 
foundation. Additional 
information emphasising 
that the chance of winning 
as low (high IU group) 
or high and minimising 
the consequence of losing 
(low IU group)
Worry
• Penn State Worry Ques-
tionnaire (Meyer et al. 
1990; Ladouceur et al. 
1992)
• 3 Items used only; adapted 
to be relevant to manipula-
tion task
Independent t tests of high/
low IU group diferences
Worry:
High IU > low IU
✓ –
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Table 2  (continued)
Article Manipulation details Outcome symptom and 
measure(s)
Analytic approach Outcome  summarya Compared to low  IUb
Anxiety > in high IU NA > in high IU
Meeten et al. (2012) Based on manipulation by 
Kelly (2009)
Vignette describing a 
character in an uncertain 
situation with poten-
tial negative outcome. 
The character (which 
is sex-congruent with 
participant) has either high 
or low IU
Participants instructed to 
consider a situation in 
their own life with similar 
unknown outcome, then 
write a diary entry (and re-
read) about that situation 
as if they are the character 
from the vignette
Anxiety and mood
• Visual Analogue Scale
4 Items assessing happi-
ness, sadness, anxiety, and 
arousal
• Change only assessed for 
sadness and anxiety
Catastrophising/worry
• Catastrophising Interview 
(Davey 2006; Vasey and 
Borkovec 1992)
2 × 3 mixed ANOVA of 
high/low IU group difer-
ences pre-to-post manipu-
lation (t2 & t3) (anxiety 
and mood only)
Independent t test of high/
low IU group diferences
Sadness:
High IU > low IU group 
irrespective of time
High IU > low IU pre-
to-post manipulation 
(between t1 and t2, main-
tained at t3)
High IU > low IU (at t2 and 
3, respectively)
Anxiety:
High IU ≃ low IU pre-to-
post manipulation
High IU > low IU group 
anxiety (at t2 only)
Happiness and arousal:
High IU ≃ low IU
Catastrophising:
High IU > low IU group
~ ✓
Mosca et al. (2016)
 Study 1
Replicated manipulation by 
Grenier and Ladouceur 
(2004) adapted to use per-
sonally relevant life events
A Vertical Arrow Technique 
(VAT) of idiographic 
negative life event was 
conducted in the morning. 
In the afternoon, partici-
pants were instructed to 
recall the event and read 
aloud a series of state-
ments designed to induce 
either high or low IU, 
dependent on group
Worry
• Worry and Intolerance 
of Uncertainty Question-
naire: Worry subscale 
(Grenier and Ladouceur 
2004)
Afect
• Positive and Negative 
Afect Schedule (Watson 
et al. 1988)
ANCOVAd of high/low IU/
control group diference 
(covariate: pre-manipula-
tion scores)
Mediation analysis (control-
ling for pre-manipulation 
scores)
Reverse models also con-
ducted
Worry:
High IU ≃ low IU
Positive afect:
High IU ≃ low IU
Negative afect:
High IU > low IU
Worry and negative afect 
(mediation):
IU fully mediated experi-
mental manipulation → 
worry; partially mediated 
experimental manipulation 
→ NA
Reverse models demon-
strated signiicant partial 
mediations
X ✓
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Table 2  (continued)
Article Manipulation details Outcome symptom and 
measure(s)
Analytic approach Outcome  summarya Compared to low  IUb
Anxiety > in high IU NA > in high IU
 Study 2 As above, with following 
modiications: (1) 7–14 
days between VAT and 
statements (M = 9.98, 
SD = 2.15 days), (2) re-
reading of VAT prior to 
high/low IU statements, 
and (3) statements read, 
but not aloud
Control condition: partici-
pants read neutral state-
ments
Worry
• Worry and Intolerance 
of Uncertainty Question-
naire: Worry subscale 
(Grenier and Ladouceur 
2004)
Afect
• Visual Analogue scale
• 4 Adjectives: happy and 
calm (composite used as 
positive afect); sad and 
anxious (composite used 
as negative afect)
ANCOVAd of high/low 
IU group diferences 
(covariate: pre-manipu-
lation scores and interval 
between VAT and state-
ments)
Mediation analysis using 
conirmatory path analysis
Reverse models also con-
ducted
Worry:
High IU > low IU
Low IU ≃ control
Negative afect:
High IU > low IU
Low IU ≃ control
Positive afect:
High IU ≃ low IU ≃ control
Worry, negative afect, and 
positive afect (mediation):
IU mediator model manipu-
lation group → symptom 
level reportedly better it 
than reverse models
✓ ✓
Rosen and Knäuper (2009) Based on linguistic manipu-
lation by Salancik and 
Conway (1975)
High and low IU manipula-
tion groups presented with 
IU questionnaire items 
combined with quali-
iers designed to increase 
(high IU) or decrease (low 
IU group) likelihood of 
endorsement. Standardised 
feedback to questionnaire 
performance in relation 
to IU was then presented 
to reinforce high/low IU 
groups
Situational Uncertainty (SU) 
also manipulated at two 
levels (low/high)
Worry and anxiety
1. Penn State Worry Ques-
tionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer 
et al. 1990)
2. State-Trait Anxiety Scale 
(STAI; Spielberger 1983)
3. 1 Likert-scale item 
assessing worry due to 
uncertainty relating to 
ictitious health condition 
used in manipulation task
ANCOVA of high/low IU 
group diferences (covari-
ates: STAI (state and 
trait) and PSWQ baseline 
scores)
2 × 2 ANCOVA of high/low 
IU × high/low SU group 
diferences (covariates: 
baseline IU, STAI, PSWQ, 
and motivation to reduce 
uncertainty) for worry 
single item
Worry and anxiety:
(All measures, except worry 
single item)
High IU ≃ low IU
Worry single item:
IU*SU interaction = high 
IU/high SU > low IU/
low SU
X –
NA negative afect
a > = statistically signiicantly greater levels of stated variable; < = statistically signiicantly lower levels of stated variable; ≃ = no signiicant diference
b ✓ = supportive evidence; X = no supportive evidence; ~ = mixed or inconclusive evidence; – = not assessed
c Measured by the Penn State Worry Questionnaire (Meyer et al. 1990); included as a covariate, not outcome measure
d Non-parametric RANCOVA also conducted. ANCOVA and RANCOVA results were equivalent
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Table 3  Temporal precedence studies with intervention details and outcomes
Article Intervention details Outcome symptoms and 
measure(s)
Analysis Outcome  summarya Temporal 
 precedenceb
Analytic approach Lag  durationc IU → 
symp-
tom
Symp-
tom → 
IU
Bomyea et al. (2015) Cognitive behavioural therapy
Ten one hour sessions over 
10–12 weeks
Computer assisted individual 
sessions with therapist
Based on Coordinated Anxi-
ety Learning and Manage-
ment program (CALM; 
Craske et al. 2009)
Worry
• Abbreviated Penn State 
Worry Questionnaire 
(Hopko et al. 2003)
Mediation analysis (predic-
tor = time; mediator at t; 
outcome at t + 1)
Reverse model switching 
mediator and outcome also 
conducted
2 Weeks Worry:
Decrease in IU mediated sub-
sequent decrease in worry 
across time
Reverse model:
Non-signiicant
✓ X
Goldman et al. (2007) Written exposure
Five 30 min writing sessions
Experimental participants: 
wrote a scenario of their 
worst fear including details 
of their emotion and experi-
ence; increasing description 
depth across sessions
Control participants: wrote 
about a hypothetical non-
emotional event
Worry
• Penn State Worry Question-
naire (Meyer et al. 1990)
• Adapted for weekly assess-
ment consistent with Stöber 
and Bittencourt (1998); but 
retained 5 point rating
Generalised anxiety disorder 
somatic symptoms
• Worry and Anxiety 
Questionnaire (Dugas et al. 
2001)
• Adapted for weekly assess-
ment
Depression
• Center for Epidemiological 
Studies Depression Scale 
(Radlof 1977)
Hierarchical linear modelling
(Predictor at t predicting 
outcome variable at t + 1; 
controlling predictor at 
t + 1)
Reverse model switching 
predictor and outcome also 
conducted
1 Week approx.d Intervention group results
Worry, GAD, and depression
IU → subsequent worry, 
GAD somatic symptoms, 
and depression
Reverse models: non-signif-
icant
Control group results
Worry, GAD, and depression
IU did not predict worry, 
GAD somatic symptoms, or 
depression
Reverse models: worry and 
depression → subsequent 
IU
~ ~
Hedman et al. (2013) Internet-based cognitive 
behavioural therapy
12 Weekly modules (module 
duration not speciied)
Therapist involved in inter-
vention without face-to-face 
contact
Mindfulness training included 
with CBT components
Health anxiety
• Short version of the Health 
Anxiety Inventory (Salkovs-
kis et al. 2002)
• Composite of “Disease 
Conviction” and “Fear 
and Worry about Illness” 
subscales used as outcome 
variable
Mixed efects model
(Predictor at t − 1; outcome at 
t, controlling for outcome 
at t − 1)
Reverse model switching pre-
dictor and outcome variable 
also conducted
1 Week Health anxiety
IU → subsequent health 
anxiety
Reverse model: health anxiety 
→ subsequent IU
✓ ✓
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a → = signiicantly predicts
b IU → symptom = IU change precedes symptom change; symptom → IU = Symptom change precedes IU change; ✓ = supportive evidence; X = no supportive evidence; ~ = mixed or inconclu-
sive evidence; – = not assessed
c Lag duration = the duration between predictive and prospective assessment points; diferent articles express this same duration with diferent formulae, as either t + 1 (where t = the predictive 
assessment point) or t − 1 (where t = the prospective assessment point)
d Eight days between baseline and post-intervention assessment; subsequent two follow-up assessment occurred after one and two additional weeks, respectively
e Measured by Hamilton Depression Scale (Hamilton 1960); included as a covariate, not outcome measure
f Details of intervention not outlined in the article included in review
Table 3  (continued)
Article Intervention details Outcome symptoms and 
measure(s)
Analysis Outcome  summarya Temporal 
 precedenceb
Analytic approach Lag  durationc IU → 
symp-
tom
Symp-
tom → 
IU
Su et al. (2016) Exposure and response 
prevention
Based on Kozak and Foa 
(1997) manual
Seventeen 90 min sessions 
face-to-face with therapist; 
twice weekly over 8 weeks
Followed by 16 week main-
tenance phase: receiving 
additional full intervention 
sessions and/or 45 min 
maintenance sessions
Obsessions and compulsions
• Yale-Brown Obsessive 
Compulsive Scale (Good-
man et al. 1989a, b)
Mediation analysis
(Predictor = time; media-
tor at t; outcome at t + 1, 
controlling for outcome and 
 depressiond at t)
Reverse model switching 
mediator and outcome also 
conducted
During intervention:
4 Weeks
Maintenance phase:
• 4 Weeks
• 12 Weeks
Obsessions and compulsions:
IU did not signiicantly medi-
ate subsequent obsessions 
and compulsions
Reverse model: non-signif-
icant
X X
Wilhelm et al. (2015) Cognitive therapy
Data from previous research 
using manualised, modular 
 interventionf (see Wilhelm 
et al. 2005, 2009)
Obsessions and compulsions
• Yale-Brown Obsessive 
Compulsive Scale (Good-
man et al. 1989a)
Random efects regression 
model
(lagged time-varying change 
in covariate (t − 2 to t − 1) 
predicting outcome variable 
at t); median split employed 
on predictor (above vs. at/
below median IU reduction)
4–8 Weeks Obsessions and compulsions:
Compared to at/below median 
decrease in IU, above 
median decrease in IU → 
subsequent decrease in 
obsessions and compulsions
✓ –
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bearing on the difering results; although Deschenes and 
colleagues also controlled pre/post manipulation ‘change 
in irritability’ in their analyses, which complicates direct 
comparison.
Deschenes et al. (2010) provided the only assessment of 
interpretation bias. The study demonstrated little evidence 
that IU causes interpretation bias of ambiguous scenarios. 
There was no signiicant diference between IU manipulation 
groups in terms of worry about the scenarios or perceived 
likelihood of occurrence. Perceived ‘badness’ of scenarios 
was also comparable across groups; however, compared to 
the negative beliefs about uncertainty group, the positive 
beliefs group did provide higher ratings of the perceived 
‘goodness’ of positive scenario outcomes. Once again, anal-
yses controlled for change in irritability.
Only two studies included mediation analysis exploring 
relation between experimental group and post-manipulation 
symptom level (Mosca et al. 2016—studies 1 & 2). These 
analyses took the form of exploratory (study 1) and con-
firmatory analyses (study 2). The exploratory analyses 
found evidence that IU signiicantly mediated the relation-
ship between manipulation group and worry. However, the 
reverse model was also signiicant, suggesting worry may 
mediate the relationship between manipulation group and 
IU. The conirmatory analyses conducted (study 2) sup-
ported the indings of study one; however, the IU media-
tor model was reportedly a better it with the data than the 
reverse model. The mediation analyses were limited to one 
article and one research group. Furthermore, the analyses 
involved assessment at two time points only (post-manip-
ulation scores, controlling for pre-manipulation scores). 
Consequently, interpretation of these results should be made 
with reference to the additional evidence relating to temporal 
precedence, below.
Intervention Studies Assessing Temporal Prece-
dence Results from the three intervention studies assessing 
temporal precedence of IU change and anxiety demonstrated 
some inconsistency—see Table 3. Within the clinical sam-
ples, preceding decrease in IU reportedly mediated subse-
quent decrease in worry across time in those with diagnoses 
of GAD (Bomyea et  al. 2015); and predicted subsequent 
reduction in health anxiety in those with diagnoses of hypo-
chondriasis (Hedman et al. 2013). However, reverse models 
(swapping the mediator and outcome) demonstrated incon-
sistent indings. Hedman et al. (2013) found improvement in 
health anxiety also predicted a subsequent reduction in IU, 
whereas Bomyea et al. (2015) did not ind preceding worry 
to mediate change in subsequent IU across time.
In the non-clinical sample reported in Goldman et al. 
(2007), signiicant indings were evident but inconsistent 
across the separate analyses for control and intervention 
groups. IU was reportedly a signiicant predictor of subse-
quent worry and GAD somatic symptoms in the intervention 
Fig. 2  Forest plot of IU level 
within individual experimental 
manipulation studies: Magni-
tude of diference in IU level 
(Hedges’ adjusted g) between 
high and low IU manipulation 
groups (post-manipulation). 
aAdditional group comparisons: 
High IU vs. control group: 
Hedges’ adjusted g = 0.62 [0.23, 
1.0]; Low IU vs. control group: 
Hedges’ adjusted g = 0.26 
[− 0.64 to 0.12]
Fig. 3  Forest plot of IU level within individual temporal prec-
edence studies: Magnitude of change in IU level (Hedges’ adjusted 
g) between irst and last assessment point. aCombined sample efect 
shown (calculated using intervention and control group means and 
standard deviations). Individual group efects: Intervention group: 
Hedges’ adjusted g = − 1.61 [− 2.12, − 1.11]; control group: Hedges’ 
adjusted g = − 0.18 [− 0.62, 0.25]
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group, but not in the control. Conversely, in the control 
group, preceding worry levels signiicantly predicted sub-
sequent IU. This reverse relation was not evident in the inter-
vention group. The reported inconsistencies in these indings 
question their reliability.
Mood, Afect, and Depression
Experimental Manipulation Studies Investigation of the 
inluence of IU manipulation on emotional state featured in 
seven studies. The majority of mood and afect assessments 
included in the experimental manipulation studies utilised 
VAS. Mosca et  al. (2016) reported higher levels of nega-
tive afect (NA) in the high compared to low IU group, after 
controlling for baseline scores, using the PANAS (study 
1) and VAS (study 2); no signiicant diference in positive 
afect (PA) was found. Similarly, Meeten et al. (2012) found 
signiicantly greater increase in sadness in the high com-
pared to low IU group, but no between-group diferences 
in happiness or arousal. Faleer et al. (2017) also supported 
indings of higher NA in the high compared to low IU group 
post-manipulation (study 1) but failed to replicate this ind-
ing when assessing pre-to-post change in NA (study 2). 
Although Britton and Davey (2014) also reported signii-
cantly higher scores on a general negative mood composite 
measure in the high compare to low IU group, no signiicant 
diference was found on the individual VAS items assessing 
sadness or negativity. The composite score comprised the 
sadness and negativity items as well as an anxiety item (pre-
viously outlined). The study reported signiicant between-
group diference on the anxiety item only, suggesting that 
the observed efect on the composite score may largely have 
been driven by anxiety responses rather than overall mood. 
Finally, Deschenes et al. (2010) found signiicant decrease in 
VAS-reported irritability pre/post manipulation in the posi-
tive, compared to negative, beliefs about uncertainty group. 
However, the study authors found no signiicant between-
group diference on any other included mood measure.
Consistent with their anxiety analyses, Mosca et  al. 
(2016) conducted exploratory and confirmatory media-
tional analyses for NA across study one and two. The results 
were comparable to the anxiety mediation models: IU sig-
niicantly mediated the relationship between manipulation 
group and NA; and the reverse model was also signiicant. 
Once again, the follow-up conirmatory analyses supported 
these indings; however, the IU mediator model was report-
edly a better it with the data than the reverse model.
Intervention Studies Assessing Temporal Precedence Only 
one study investigated the temporal precedence of IU 
change in relation to depression symptom level (Goldman 
et  al. 2007). Consistent with their indings for worry and 
GAD symptoms, IU was only a signiicant predictor of sub-
sequent depression level in the intervention group, and not 
the control group. Conversely, in the control group, preced-
ing depression levels signiicantly predicted subsequent IU. 
This reverse relation was not evident in the intervention 
group.
Obsessions and Compulsions
Experimental Manipulation Studies Explicit investigation 
of OCD-relevant constructs within non-clinical samples 
featured in four studies. These studies provided limited 
evidence supporting the causal inluence of IU. Although 
one study demonstrated greater perceived threat of intrusive 
thoughts in the high compared to low IU group (Faleer et al. 
2017—study 1), no signiicant between-group diferences 
were found for inlated responsibility (Britton and Davey 
2014), checking behaviour (Faleer et al. 2017—studies 2 & 
3), or threat estimation (Faleer et al. 2017—study 3). Nota-
bly, Faleer and colleagues questioned the success of their 
manipulation in study three.
Intervention Studies Assessing Temporal Precedence The 
two temporal precedence studies involving individuals with 
diagnoses of OCD reported contrasting indings. Wilhelm 
et al. (2015) found that preceding reduction in Perfection-
ism/IU that was above (compared to at or below) the median 
magnitude of IU change in the sample, signiicantly pre-
dicted subsequent symptom level of obsessions and compul-
sions. Su et al. (2016), however, did not ind evidence that 
preceding IU mediated subsequent symptom change across 
time. Su et  al. (2016) also reported the reverse mediation 
model to be non-signiicant. Notably, compared to Wilhelm 
et al. (2015), Su and colleagues did not employ a median 
split in their analyses, utilised a larger sample size, and con-
trolled for preceding obsession and compulsion symptom 
level and depression level.
Discussion
This review evaluated the proposed causal role of IU as 
a transdiagnostic mechanism of psychological difficul-
ties through synthesis of experimental manipulation and 
temporal precedence studies. The available evidence was 
limited to anxiety- and mood-related diiculties (includ-
ing obsessive–compulsive diiculties). Compared to avail-
able correlational evidence (Gentes and Ruscio 2011), the 
limited quantity and breadth of evidence identiied in this 
review suggests that investigation of the causal inluence 
of IU remains a nascent research area. Whilst the weight of 
evidence is insuicient to reach absolute conclusions, the 
indings support the proposition that IU is a mechanism war-
ranting attention and more nuanced consideration.
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Summary of Evidence: The Inluence of Intolerance 
of Uncertainty
The greatest volume of evidence, and arguably strongest 
support for IU as a causal mechanism of psychological dif-
iculty, was present for anxiety-related symptoms (excluding 
obsessive–compulsive diiculties). This inding is predict-
able given the logical links between fear of the unknown and 
anxiety, as well as IU’s proposed role as a core feature of 
GAD (Dugas et al. 1998). To an extent, the reviewed experi-
mental manipulation evidence provides some support for 
the proposition that an increase in IU may afect an increase 
in symptoms of anxiety, such as worry and catastrophising. 
However, the evidence is by no means conclusive and cau-
tion in interpretation is required due to evident discrepan-
cies between studies. Despite this inconsistency, evaluation 
of mediation and temporal precedence analyses also pro-
vided some evidence that IU change may precede change in 
anxiety symptoms. Although, the signiicant reverse mod-
els (anxiety symptoms preceding IU) are notable and sug-
gest that bi-directional relationship between IU and anxiety 
symptoms may also require consideration.
Beyond anxiety, evidence pertaining to affect more 
broadly appeared less established; although some support for 
IU’s inluence upon NA, but not PA, was evident. However, 
the frequent sole reliance on single-item VAS assessment 
and demonstration of some inconsistency across studies, 
limits the overall reliability of this evidence. Evidence relat-
ing to temporal precedence analyses was too limited to con-
clude upon; however, the experimental manipulation media-
tion analyses and reverse mediation models (Mosca et al. 
2016) once again supported the proposition that bi-direc-
tional relationships may warrant attention. The relevance 
of these indings to speciic mood-related psychological 
conditions, such as depression, is debatable. Whilst NA is a 
component of depression, it is not the sole deining feature 
of the experience (APA 2013). Where a depression-speciic 
measure was used (i.e., Goldman et al. 2007), results were 
inconclusive and emphasise the need for further research.
The review considered OCD-related diiculties sepa-
rately from other anxiety symptoms to relect the current 
DSM stratiication of conditions (APA 2013). Consistent 
with anxiety-related diiculties, such as GAD, IU has his-
torically been linked to OCD (OCCWG, 1997). However, 
despite the established theoretic association, this review 
found weak evidence supporting IU as a causal mechanism 
contributing to OCD symptoms. Of the four relevant studies 
reviewed, only one (Faleer et al. 2017—study 1) demon-
strated evidence that IU manipulation inluenced a symp-
tom of OCD (i.e., perceived threat of an intrusive thought). 
Similarly, of the two studies providing analysis of temporal 
precedence, support for IU change preceding OCD symptom 
change was only demonstrated in the study involving the 
smaller sample and employing a categorical split of continu-
ous IU data (Wilhelm et al. 2015), which is arguably less 
reliable than the comparable evidence presented by Su et al. 
(2016). Overall, contrary to theoretical predictions, the cur-
rently available evidence does not provide strong support for 
IU as a mechanism of OCD-related diiculties.
Taken as a whole, the evidence reviewed suggests that IU 
may well exhibit some causal inluence over anxiety- and 
mood-related diiculties and may have the potential to live 
up to its proposed transdiagnostic mantle (Carleton 2012, 
2016). However, the available evidence does not encompass 
the full spectrum of diiculties proposed to involve IU. For 
example, no evidence pertaining to symptoms of other psy-
chological di culties, such as eating disorders (Brown et al. 
2017) and psychosis (White and Gumley 2010), was identi-
ied through this review. Furthermore, the evidence identi-
ied and examined was limited, not only by its diagnostic 
breadth, but also by its quantity and the level of consistency 
between indings. These limitations preclude the transdiag-
nostic mantle being awarded at present. Firm conclusions 
cannot yet be drawn.
Consideration of Evidential Inconsistencies
Varying interpretation may be made of the evidential incon-
sistency reported across both manipulation and temporal 
precedence studies. First, the evidence may suggest that the 
inluence IU exerts upon psychological diiculties is not as 
fundamental as previously proposed. Instead, the inluence 
of IU may be more interactional, depending not only on IU 
but also on the presence of one or more additional vari-
ables (e.g., as in Rosen and Knäuper 2009). To the review 
author’s knowledge, there is currently no deinitive selection 
of potential interactive variables. However, existing research 
suggests moderators may include cognitive (e.g., metacog-
nitive negative beliefs about worry, perceived control over 
threat; Ruggiero et al. 2012) as well as contextual and behav-
ioural factors (e.g., pervasive technology use becoming a 
safety behaviour; Carleton et al. 2018). Indeed, Carleton and 
colleagues’ suggestion that the wider context of technology 
availability and functionality may be contributing to increas-
ing societal levels of IU by facilitating avoidance behaviour 
emphasises the need to consider systemic, as well as indi-
vidual-orientated, factors. Second, the difering results may 
represent a need for a more nuanced conception of IU within 
experimental and temporal precedence studies. IU may be 
conceptualised as a composite of the two subcomponents: 
inhibitory and prospective IU (Carleton et al. 2007; McEvoy 
and Mahoney 2011). No study in this review evaluated these 
subcomponents. Some have proposed inhibitory and pro-
spective IU may make diferentiable contributions to difer-
ent psychological diiculties (Mahoney and McEvoy 2012; 
McEvoy and Mahoney 2011). Consequently, future research 
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may obtain results that are more consistent by accounting 
for these subcomponents. Third, methodological differ-
ences between the studies (particularly in terms of difering 
assessment methods and levels of control) may account for 
the diferent indings. Relatedly, only a limited number of 
the manipulation studies provided evidence of within-group 
change for high and low IU manipulation groups. Without 
direct test, evidence of post-manipulation between-group 
diference, even after demonstrating baseline equivalence, 
does not guarantee that signiicant within-group change in 
each manipulation group is also present. Reliance on post-
manipulation group diferences to indicate the extent of 
manipulation is limited and may obscure accurate interpre-
tation. Fourth, the review illustrates a paucity of research 
providing direct evaluation of causal relationships between 
IU and psychological diiculties. Compared to the 58 arti-
cles included in Gentes and Ruscio’s (2011) meta-analysis 
of correlational evidence, the present review identiied only 
12 articles. Consequently, one can reasonably argue that the 
current discrepancies may be manifest of the lack of suf-
icient research. Resolution of the currently discrepant ind-
ings requires a greater volume of high quality research and 
extension of exploration into other diiculties of proposed 
relevance, such as eating disorders and psychosis.
Developing Further Research Exploring Causality
Consideration of the importance of causal evidence warrants 
additional attention. The most common reason for exclusion 
of articles from this review during the screening process 
was that they presented correlational data only. Whilst cor-
relational data provide a useful irst step towards identify-
ing relations between variables, these data remain only a 
irst step (Kazdin 2007). Without reliable investigation of 
whether direct change in a proposed mechanism instigates 
subsequent change in di culties, claim of a causal relation is 
premature. This next step is crucial to gaining a better under-
standing of the mechanisms of psychological diiculties 
and the development of mechanism-focused interventions. 
Whilst we may expect a delay between theoretical proposi-
tion of a mechanism and generation of a substantial body of 
evidence investigating its causal inluence, the propositions 
of IU’s relevance to diiculties such as GAD (e.g., Dugas 
et al. 1998) and OCD (e.g., OCCWG 1997) are well estab-
lished, yet suicient evaluation of causality remains lacking. 
Notably, IU appears considered a clinically relevant target 
for intervention (see Gillett et al. 2018), despite the limited 
causal research available to substantiate this focus. This 
review vehemently echoes Shihata et al. (2016) imploration 
for a greater body of research explicitly exploring IU as a 
causal mechanism of psychological di culty through exper-
imental and longitudinal designs. Recent meta-analytic evi-
dence suggesting that population levels of IU may actually 
be increasing over time underscores the importance of this 
call (Carleton et al. 2018).
The criticism suggested here is not peculiar to IU. Mecha-
nisms of psychological diiculties and interventions remain 
contested and insuiciently understood (Kazdin 2007). If 
psychological interventions are to take their most efective 
and eicient form, then the agents of change must be fully 
understood, and currently they are not. Consequently, let 
us more frequently move beyond the correlational to gain 
greater insight into causal inluence and the temporal prec-
edence of proposed mechanisms of psychological diiculty 
and therapeutic change.
Recommendations and Future Directions
Several recommendations are proposed. First, the discrepant 
indings warrant additional research assessing causality and 
temporal precedence to enable reliable conclusions. Inclu-
sion of replications studies would also strengthen continued 
investigation by providing directly comparable methodolo-
gies. Furthermore, a more nuanced consideration of IU, eval-
uating subcomponents, may prove useful. Second, extending 
investigation beyond anxiety- and mood-related diiculties 
to other psychological di culties in which IU is of proposed 
relevance (such as eating disorders and psychosis) would 
help evaluate the full extent of IU’s trandiagnostic breadth. 
Increased involvement of clinical samples would assist this 
endeavour by investigating diiculties at the extremes of the 
spectrum of human experience and thus where the potential 
impact and inluence of IU may be most profound. Third, 
incorporating assessments that provide detailed evalua-
tion, compared to single-item VAS (particularly for mood, 
afect, and depression), would arguably permit evaluation 
of multidimensional conceptions of diiculties and avoid 
unwanted reductionism of complex experiences. Further-
more, as has been suggested elsewhere (see Shihata et al. 
2016), attention to measurement validation and considera-
tion of behavioural assessment would improve the reliability 
of comparison across studies. Finally, bi-directional rela-
tionships between IU and symptoms of psychological dif-
iculties may exist. Inclusion of reverse mediation models in 
temporal precedence studies, and investigation of the efects 
of symptom manipulation upon IU in experimental designs 
(e.g., see Britton and Davey 2014, studies 1–2; not eligible 
for inclusion within this review), may clarify these potential 
relationships.
Limitations
There are limitations to this review. First, the evidently 
nascent area of causal research into IU may necessitate 
widening consideration to more preliminary research 
data, such as single-case designs, small scale pilot/clinical 
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studies evaluating temporal precedence of change (e.g., 
Dugas and Ladouceur 2000; Overton and Menzies 2005), 
and prospective studies with only two assessment points 
(e.g., Oglesby et al. 2016). The current review excluded 
these studies to provide a strict threshold for reliability; 
however, future broader reviews may consider these study 
types as useful sources of information. Second, only Eng-
lish language and peer-reviewed articles were included. 
Whilst a pragmatic and common approach within system-
atic reviews, these criteria limit the breadth of evidence 
considered. In particular, future reviews may seek to 
involve translators and/or bilingual researchers to over-
come bias towards English language only publications. 
Third, as stated, the heterogeneity of the study methodol-
ogy and analyses complicates interpretation of the results. 
Fourth, the review focused on symptoms of psychologi-
cal conditions, rather than assessment of full diagnoses, 
and permitted inclusion of participants from non-clinical 
populations. Assessment of individual symptoms provides 
information that is relevant, but not equivalent, to psychi-
atric diagnoses. Fifth, while IU efect sizes provided were 
included to inform study comparison, a number of limita-
tions should held in mind. The manipulation studies efect 
sizes represent post-manipulation group diferences only, 
not change. Temporal precedence efect sizes represent 
change across two time points only (irst and last assess-
ment points) and therefore provide a limited representation 
of variation across longitudinal assessment and may not 
capture the greatest level of IU change during the study. 
Finally, inter-rater agreement demonstrated support for 
screening reliability, but was limited to a subset of identi-
ied articles.
Conclusions
The present review provides some support for IU as a causal 
mechanism of anxiety- and mood-related di culties, but not 
without substantial caveat. The review results highlight that 
currently available evidence does not provide an exhaustive 
account of the role of IU in psychological diiculties and, 
instead, raises additional questions that require exploration. 
There is clear need for a greater volume of research, extend-
ing beyond correlation to direct investigation of causality, 
to resolve the evidential discrepancies observed and com-
prehensively evaluate the proposed breadth of IU’s trans-
diagnostic relevance. Bi-directionality of relations between 
IU and symptoms of diiculties may also prove a useful 
avenue for additional consideration. Overall, a more elabo-
rate evidence-base is required to substantiate the proposed 
extent and utility of IU as a causal, transdiagnostic mecha-
nism underpinning psychological diiculty.
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